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When Lawyers and Accountants Disagree
By E. E. Wakefield
Study of recent new general corporation laws—for example,
the Illinois law adopted in 1933—provokes discussion of certain
questions as to which there seems to be a decided difference of
opinion between experienced and able lawyers on the one hand
and experienced and able accountants on the other hand. The
underlying reasons for these differences of opinion are, of course,
in part different training and different professional background.
To me, the reasons for differences seem in part also to be due to
failure of each profession to think through to a clear understand
ing of the views of the other. Another source of differing views
is in the failure to recognize sufficiently the fact that accounting
terminology can not be an entirely exact medium of expression.
It is not like the formulae of chemistry.
Two questions which illustrate the sources of these differences
in views between lawyers and accountants are: (1) as to treatment
of treasury stock as affecting surplus available for dividends, and
(2) as to the propriety of charging dividends and operating losses
to capital surplus.
With reference to treasury stock, the lawyers say, quite cor
rectly, that purchase of treasury stock does not of itself reduce
capital. Hence, since the only other thing it can be taken to
reduce is surplus, a balance-sheet which shows treasury stock de
ducted from capital must overstate surplus. Under the Illinois
business corporation act, 1933, by implication (section 6), such a
statement of treasury stock is forbidden. Ought accountants
then to say, “We have erred when we made balance-sheets show
ing treasury stock deducted from capital. Let us repent!’’?
Apparently able lawyers think so. But if they so think, have they
quite realized what the accountants are trying to do when they
make balance-sheets with treasury stock deducted from capital?
It is certainly true that mere purchase of treasury stock does not
reduce capital, in the statutory sense. Corporation laws specifi
cally provide the methods by which capital can be reduced, and
corporations, being creatures of statute, can do things in a way
that is technically correct only if they adhere to statutory require
ments. Yet there is really a more fundamental fact to be taken
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into consideration. Once stock has been acquired by the corpora
tion it need not be issued again unless the corporation sees fit.
Certain stockholders, who, previous to such acquisition, had a
claim to share in the corporate assets, have no longer such a claim.
Hence, those stockholders who remain will in fact have a right to
an increased amount in excess of the capital which their stock
represents. The source of this excess may be entirely earnings of
the corporation. To tell these remaining stockholders, through
a balance-sheet, that earned surplus is only $100,000, made up of
$150,000 net earnings, less $50,000 paid for treasury stock of
$50,000 par value, is only to require them to make a mental ad
justment of the figures to reconcile them with what the stock
holders know to be the fact, viz., that the company has earned
$150,000 and still has that amount plus enough to cover all the
capital represented by stock outside the treasury. If a state
corporation law requires that purchases of treasury stock be
charged to earned surplus, of course the only way to make a
balance-sheet under such a law is to follow the statute and to show
purchased treasury stock as a reduction of earned surplus. If
there is no such requirement in the state law—and the laws of
most of the states have as yet no such provision—then the prob
lem is not one of absolutely right expression one way and abso
lutely wrong expression the other. The question is how best to
express by accounting terminology the facts which should be indi
cated, with as little explanatory description as a proper statement
will require. The problem may well be viewed, therefore, as one
in which the best the accountant can do, short of using long, ex
planatory phrases, is to select the form of statement which will
most readily give the fundamentally important information
which the reader may be expected to want, adding, if it seems
advisable in a particular case, a direct statement that statutory
capital has not been reduced.
Both the lawyers and the accountants may be right in their
views, and the really important thing may not be to argue which
is the more nearly right but to appreciate that in any given case
the accountant must suit his form of statement to the situation,
having mastered the legal principles, as the lawyers understand
them, and the problems of practical expression in accounting
terminology, as the accountants understand them.
Similarly, with regard to capital surplus and charges to it for
dividends and for losses, undoubtedly the lawyers are right when
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they say that if the law of the state permits dividends and losses
to be charged to capital surplus the bookkeeping is in accordance
with the law if it so shows such charges. But again the question
of the capacity of accounting terminology to express facts be
comes the thing of paramount importance. Neither the form of
the statute nor the terminology of accounting can change the fact
as to whether the corporation has or has not increased its invest
ment by operations. If it hasn’t, it hasn’t, no matter how, as a
mere question of law, the results may be legally shown in the ac
counts. But the meaning of words and phrases used in account
ing must be sufficiently generally accepted that readers may be
expected to understand the terms used as they were intended to be
understood. Surplus is, vaguely, excess of something over some
thing else. Earned surplus may reasonably be assumed to mean
such an excess which arose from operations. Hence, the minute
some part of the result of operations, such as a loss, is charged to
what has not been earned but has been contributed, as capital
surplus, the natural meaning of the term earned surplus is ob
scured. It, then, has to mean such part of net worth as came
from operations if parts of the results of operations are excluded
and charged or credited somewhere else. Now, if anybody
knows that this is so and is given enough information so that he
may make his own corrections and find out how much earned sur
plus there would have been if all the results of operations had been
charged or credited to earned surplus, he is of course not misin
formed. But if the purpose of a statement is to try to show re
sults in terms of investment and increases or decreases thereof
by operations, why make the reader figure it out for himself, when
for many years we have had in earned surplus a term which at
least in a general way indicates results of operations?
A change of familiar accounting terminology by statutory pro
vision, such as permission to charge dividends to capital surplus
as in the Illinois law (section 41 (b) with reference to preferred
dividends) easily leads to the perversion of results which the fram
ers of the statute probably wanted to avoid.
A corporation has capital of $100,000, half preferred and half
common, and capital surplus of $50,000. It proceeds to lose
$25,000, which is charged to capital surplus. It then pays $3,000
preferred dividends, charged to capital surplus. Next it earns
$25,000, which is credited to earned surplus. Its net progress,
through operations, beyond the amount invested, is zero. But if
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it wishes to pay a dividend on common stock it seems to be free to
do so, and the total result is really that common stock gets a divi
dend in effect out of contributed and not out of earned resources
of the corporation. If the $25,000 loss had been charged to def
icit, doubtless the legal position would have been the same, but
at least creditors and preferred stockholders would have had
what was really happening more clearly indicated to them and
the probability of payment of what was really a dividend to the
common stock out of capital, in the broader sense of the term,
might have been lessened. It is true that preferred-stock agree
ments may limit dividends on common stock, whatever the
statute provides, but if they do, it is no doubt on the supposition
that the procedure ought in principle to be as the preferred-stock
agreement indicates and ought not to be obscured by the ac
counting.
It seems clear to me that lawyers and accountants must strive
to understand each other better as to the possibilities in the use of
accounting terminology even when they come into agreement as
to the facts and the law involved.
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